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Abstract
Individuals’ output often depends not just on their ability and actions, but also on
external factors or fundamentals, whose effect they cannot separately identify. At the
same time, many individuals have incorrect beliefs about their own ability. Heidhues et al.
(2018) characterise overconfident and underconfident individuals’ equilibrium beliefs and
learning process in these situations. They argue overconfident individuals will act sub-
optimally because of how they learn. We carry out the first experimental test of their
theory. Subjects take incorrectly-marked tests, and we measure how they learn about
the marker’s accuracy (the fundamental) over time. We use machine learning to identify
heterogeneous effects. Overconfident subjects have lower beliefs about the fundamental,
as Heidhues et al. (2018) predict, and thus would make sub-optimal decisions. But we
find no evidence it is because of how they learn.
Keywords—Overconfidence, learning, Berk–Nash equilibrium, misspecified models, experimental
economics
JEL Codes: D83, D84, D290
An individual’s output often depends not just on their own ability and actions, but other external
factors or fundamentals. To fix ideas, consider the example of a student completing an assignment.
The student’s grade depends not just on their ability and how much effort they put into their work,
but how harshly their professor marks it. Often, the individual cannot identify the separate effects
of their ability and fundamentals on their output. An individuals’ optimal action thus depends on
their belief about the fundamental. If they only observe their grade, the student cannot tell how much
comes from their ability and from their professor’s marking. Thus the return to effort they expect
depends on how harsh they think the professor is.
At the same time, individuals are often overconfident – they believe their ability is higher than it
actually is (e.g see Svenson (1981), Camerer & Lovallo (1999), Hoffman & Burks (2017)). Sometimes,
individuals are underconfident – they believe that their ability is less than or equal to what it actually
is. Here, we test how an individual’s confidence affects learning about fundamentals when they cannot
separately identify the effect of the fundamentals and ability on output.
∗We thank Johannes Abeler, Bassel Tarbush, Stefania Innocenti, Miguel Ballester, Alex Teytelboym, and
Jens Koed Madsen, as well as seminar participants at the University of Oxford, for helpful comments. This
work was supported by The Queen’s College and Trinity College, University of Oxford. The usual disclaimer
applies. Corresponding author: Kieran Marray, Institute for New Economic Thinking, Manor Road Building,
Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ. Email: kieran.marray@maths.ox.ac.uk
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In this paper, we carry out the first experimental test of Heidhues et al. (2018), who charac-
terise overconfident and underconfident individuals equilibrium beliefs and learning process in these
situations. They assume individuals do not update their belief about their own ability. This causes
overconfident individuals’ belief about the value of the fundamental to fall as they update, converging
to a point significantly less than its true value. They make sub–optimal decisions because of their
inaccurate beliefs, observe lower than expected output, and then conclude the fundamental is even
worse than they expected. Learning is self-defeating – as overconfident individuals update, their belief
about the fundamental gets less and less accurate. The student thinks their lower than expected
marks are just because the professor is harsher than they actually are, so next time they put in less
effort than they should, get even lower marks, conclude that the professor is even harsher than they
thought and so on. Yet underconfident individuals’ beliefs about the fundamental converge to a point
near its true value, bounded by their belief about their ability.
Thus, the theory makes three predictions. Firstly, overconfident individuals’ beliefs about the
value of the fundamental should fall as they update – they think it is worse and worse. Secondly,
underconfident individuals’ beliefs about the fundamental should converge towards its true value as
they update. It follows from these two predictions that overconfident individuals should have lower
beliefs about the value of the fundamental than underconfident individuals after several rounds of
updating – they should think it is worse than underconfident individuals do.
To test the theory, we get subjects to answer five sets of questions, marked by a ‘computerised
marker’ that only marks a proportion of correct answers as correct. We infer their beliefs about the
proportion of correct answers it marks as correct. Then, we use regression models with individual
fixed effect to identify the causal effect of updating on these beliefs. The proportion of correct answers
marked as correct is the value of the fundamental. Subjects do not know the true value. We pay
subjects for each mark they get, and tell them how many marks they got, after each round. We
identify each subject’s belief about the proportion of correct answers marked as correct after each
round through a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak game (Becker et al. 1964) where subjects bid to take
an additional, correctly marked, test. Only the number of times subjects update changes over the
experiment. Thus, we can identify the causal effect of updating on beliefs by regressing the number of
times they have updated on subjects’ belief about the proportion of correct answers marked as correct
with individual fixed effects. We use this to test each of the predictions above. We test the first two by
fitting fixed effect panel models to subjects belief, and its squared distance from the true value, in each
round. We test the third by regressing a dummy variable for overconfidence on subjects beliefs after
the first and final tests. We then fit a non-parametric Gaussian mixture model (see Lindsay (1995)) to
overconfident subjects’ marks and beliefs in the first and final rounds to find heterogeneous effects. We
are the first in the literature on overconfidence to use machine learning to find heterogeneous effects.
We find that overconfident subjects have a significantly lower beliefs about the value of the fun-
damental than underconfident subjects after both the first and final rounds. But we do not find a
a significant causal effect of updating on overconfident subjects’ beliefs or the squared distance of
underconfident subjects’ beliefs from the true value of the fundamental. Thus, they do not appear to
be different because of how individuals learn. We do not find any heterogeneous effects either. This
is inconsistent with Heidhues et al.’s theory.
Thus our results do suggest that overconfident individuals will act sub-optimally in these situations.
Their beliefs about the fundamental are too low, so they will act sub-optimally. They think the marker
is too harsh, so will put too little effort into work and so on. But we find no evidence that this is
because of how they learn about the fundamental.
This is key because, if correct, Heidhues et al.’s theory has important implications. Overconfidence
is common and individuals cannot separately identify the effects of fundamentals from ability in a
wide array of economically important situations, from CEOs making investment decisions (e.g see
Malmendier & Tate (2005) Malmendier & Tate (2008)), to managers delegating to their employees
(see Heidhues et al. (2018)), to partisan politicians choosing policies (e.g see Rollwage et al. (2018)).
1 It suggests these individuals will often act sub–optimally because of how they learn, leading to large
widespread welfare losses. Costly interventions to correct individuals expectations about their own
1See Heidhues et al. (2018) pp. 1165− 1166 for more applications
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ability could prevent this by changing how they learn, and thus be welfare-improving. We find no
evidence that overconfident individuals have incorrect beliefs because of how they learn though. Thus,
interventions acting through changing the learning process might not be effective.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 summarises Heidhues et al.’s theory. Section
2 explains our design. Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 concludes.
1 Predictions
Consider an individual, who produces observable output qt based on their action, e, their ability, a,
and some fundamental φ. For example, imagine a student taking tests, who gets marks (qt) based on
the effort they put in (e), how good they are at their subject (a), and the proportion of their correct
answers their professor marks as correct (φ). We can describe them as producing output using the
output function:
qt = Q(e, a, φ) + t, (1)
where:
Q(e, a, φ) = φf(a, e)− c(e). (2)
c(e) is the cost of choosing a given action (here putting in more effort – costly due to fatigue, and the
leisure time they could take otherwise) which is convex; t is an i.i.d error term; output is increasing in
the fundamental, the action, and ability, and the optimal action e∗(φ) is increasing in the fundamental.2
The student gets more marks the less harshly their professor marks their works, the more effort they
put into it, and the better they are at their subject.
This is a generalisation of the output function given by (Heidhues et al. (2018) pg.1165)3 This
task, and associated output function, is a key example in the paper where their theory should apply.
Consider a situation where the individual does not know the true values of φ and a, and they
observe qt each time period. The student just observes their marks, not their own ability or the
professor’s harshness. Denote the individual’s belief about their own ability as a˜ – how good the
student thinks they are. Assume the individual updates their belief about φ using Bayes’ rule from
heterogeneous priors, but critically does not update a˜. Regardless of the marks they observe, the
student does not change their belief about how good they are, but instead only changes their belief
about how harsh a marker their professor is.
Now, we can begin to characterise their learning process and equilibrium beliefs.
Definition 1 An individual’s surprise function is:
Γ(φ) = Q(e∗(φ), A,Φ)−Q(e∗(φ), a˜, φ). (3)
where A is their actual ability, and Φ is the true value of the fundamental. Their surprise is the
difference between the output they get and the output they expect to get given their beliefs about
their ability and the professor’s harshness. Using this, we can define our solution concept.
Definition 2 The Berk–Nash equilibrium of a game with misspecified models is the set e∗(φ), a, φ
such that Γ(φ) = 0 i.e
Q(e∗(φ), A,Φ) = Q(e∗(φ), a˜, φ). (4)
2Or technically, ∂Q(e,a,φ)∂φ > 0,
∂Q(e,a,φ)
∂e > 0,
∂Q(e,a,φ)
∂a > 0, and
∂2Q(e,a,φ)
∂e∂φ > 0.
3More specifically, they say that we can describe them using the output function Q(e, a, φ) = (a+ e)φ− c(e).
This is too restrictive though – the following does not depend on the student’s raw output being strictly linear
in effort and ability as long as it satisfies the above condition. Thus, we use a more general form. Note this
also applies for any Q(e, a, φ) that satisfies the assumptions below without loss of generality.
3
This is the point where the individual’s average output is what they expect it to be – the student
gets what they think they should get. Note here that the individual’s beliefs do not have to be correct
for this to be a stable equilibrium. They just have to be consistent with the output they observe. As
the output they believe they should get is the same as the output they actually observe (Γ(φ) = 0)
they do not revise their belief about φ based on what they observe. Assume that for each Q(e, a˜, φ)
there is some φ
′
such that Q(e, a˜, φ
′
) = Q(e,A,Φ) – a Berk–Nash equilibrium that exists whatever the
individual’s belief about their own ability.
Now, we can characterise how confidence affects how individuals learn, and their equilibrium φ.
First, consider an individual who is overconfident.
Proposition 1 (Heidhues et al. (2018)) Consider an individual with a˜ > A, who sets e to myopi-
cally optimise q. Their belief φ converges to some φ∞ such that φ∞ < Φ. The point e∗(φ∞), a˜, φ∞ is
a unique, stable, Berk-Nash equilibrium.
For ease, we just sketch the ‘heuristic argument’ that beliefs will converge here, not the technical
proof (see Heidhues et al. (2018) pg. 1168− 9, for the technical proofs that beliefs will converge, see
pg. 1185−1211). In all the below, for both overconfident and underconfident individuals, we consider
the case of a myopic individual without loss of generality – see Heidhues et al. for the case where they
dynamically optimise.
Figure 1: Learning with Overconfident Beliefs When Action is Endogenous
Consider an overconfident individual in time period t = 0, represented in Figure 1. For example,
assume they are an overconfident student as above. To fix ideas, assume we can describe their payoff
from their work using the specific output function:
qt = φ(a+ et)− e2t . (5)
Taking the derivative with respect to effort and setting it equal to zero, we can see that, for a
given φ, the optimal action is:
4
e∗(φ) =
φ
2
. (6)
Thus for easier reading, we put e, φ2 on the horizontal axis.
Call their prior belief about φ, φ1. Call the average output that the student thinks they can achieve
given what they believe their ability and the fundamental is their ‘perceived average achievable output
line’ Q(e∗(φ), a˜, φ) – the marks they think they should get given how good they think they are and
how harsh they think their professor is. Call the average output the student can actually achieve
given what their ability and the fundamental actually are the ‘average output possibilities curve’
Q(e∗(Φ), A,Φ) - the actual mark the student gets given how good they actually are and how harsh
their professor actually is. As they are myopically optimising their actions, at t = 1 the student sets
e to optimise Q(e(φ1), a˜, φ1). This would put them at point B1 in Figure 1, with where they put in
effort φ12 and receive payoff q1,e. Then they observe their payoff. As their actual ability is A < a˜,
they are actually on the ‘average output possibility curve’ Q(e∗(φ), a˜, φ). Instead of achieving the
point B1 and observing q1,e, they actually get to C1 and observe q1,a. Their marks are lower than
they expected. The individual then updates their beliefs using this new information. Yet they cannot
change their belief about a˜, so they must infer that they are still on Q(e∗(φ), a˜, φ). Therefore, they
take this lower than expected output as a signal that the fundamental is worse than they believed.
As they cannot update a˜ they must be at the point where they would achieve q1,a on Q(e
∗(φ), a˜, φ).
Thus they infer that φ = φ2. Their professor is obviously just a harsher marker than they thought
they were!
After updating their beliefs, the process repeats - they think they will achieve B2 but instead end
up at C2, causing them to infer the professor is a harsher marker than they thought, and so on, until
they end up at E. This is the stable equilibrium - at E their actual output function and the output
function they believe they have intersect, so the output they expect and the output they actually
observe are the same. The student always reduces their effort in the test until get the marks they
expect to get given what they believe their ability is and how harsh they believe their professor is.
Beliefs must converge to this equilibrium, as whenever the individual is at a point above E they must
revise their beliefs down.
Now we turn to the case of individuals who are underconfident.4
Proposition 2 (Heidhues et al. (2018)) Consider an individual with a˜ ≤ A, who sets e to myopi-
cally optimise q. Their belief φ converges to some φ∞ such that |φ∞ −Φ| ≤ ∆, where ∆ = A− a˜ The
point e∗(φ′∞), a˜, φ∞ is a unique, stable, Berk-Nash equilibrium.
Again, the individual sets their action to myopically optimise q subject to their loss function,
thinking they are on Q(e∗, a˜, φ). The student puts the amount of effort into the test to optimise their
output from their marks minus the cost of effort. Yet assume that they now initially observe a higher
than expected output. This observation causes them to revise their beliefs about the fundamental
upwards. If their belief about the fundamental is now too optimistic, they will observe lower than
expected output and revise their belief about the fundamental downwards. If their belief about the
fundamental is still too pessimistic, they will observe higher than expected output and revise their
beliefs about the fundamental upwards. If they get lower than expected marks in the next test, they
conclude that the professor must be harsher; if they get higher than expected marks, they conclude
that the professor must be less harsh. This causes them to reduce or increase the e in the next time
period. If the professor is harsher than expected, it is worth putting in less effort; if the professor is
less harsh than expected, it is worth putting in more effort. This process continues until their belief
converges to the limiting belief φ∞ where Q(e, a˜, φ∞) = Q(e,A,Φ). This is the stable equilibrium -
their output function and the output function they believe they have intersect, so the output they
4We group individuals whose beliefs about their own ability are accurate and those whose beliefs are about
their own ability are too low together. We refer to all of these individuals as ‘underconfident’. Heidhues et al. do
not mention people with accurate expectations, but we think this is a reasonable interpretation of their theory –
misguided learning is directly caused by being overconfident, so all individuals who are not overconfident should
not exhibit misguided learning Heidhues et al. (2018).
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expect and the output they actually observe are the same. They get the mark they expect to get.
Instead of causing their belief about the fundamental to diverge from its true value, updating now
causes their belief about the fundamental to converge to a point near its true value. Learning is
self-correcting, not self-defeating, when individuals are underconfident.
Individuals learn in a misguided manner about φ in this model because they cannot update a˜ or
separately identify the effect of φ from a. If they could update their belief about a˜, they could update
the average output possibility curve they think they are on. If they could separately identify the effects
of φ and a, they could identify discrepancies in their beliefs about φ and a. In both cases, the only
stable equilibrium set of beliefs is φ = Φ, and a˜ = a. At any other point, q will be different from what
they expect given their beliefs about φ and a, so the individual will update their beliefs about one of
them. The first assumption is key - the individual’s degenerate belief about their own ability drives
their learning behaviour in situations where they cannot separate the effect of φ and a on output.
Heidhues et al. assume it for two reasons: because it generates a simple, tractable model, and because
they think it is realistic (see Heidhues et al. (2018) pg 1163). Individuals are often reluctant to revise
beliefs about themselves.
Heidhues et al’s model makes three predictions about individuals’ beliefs about φ after several
rounds of updating:5
Prediction 1 After multiple rounds of updating, overconfident individuals will have lower beliefs about
φ on average than underconfident individuals
Prediction 2 Updating will cause the overconfident individuals’ beliefs about φ to decrease
Prediction 3 Updating will cause underconfident individuals’ beliefs about φ to converge towards Φ.
The second and third directly fall out of the above. The first follows from the second and the third.
Imagine overconfident and underconfident individuals draw their initial beliefs from the same distribu-
tion. Thus, before individuals start updating, E(φOverconfident) = E(φUnderconfident). Overconfident
individuals’ beliefs fall as they update, so they converge to φ∞ < Φ. Underconfident individuals’
beliefs converge to φ∞ ≈ Φ. So the expectation of overconfident individuals’ beliefs will be strictly
lower than the expectation of underconfident individuals’ beliefs.
We can use the structure of the output function to test these predictions. Take (2), and separate
the left hand side into observed output, the marks the student gets, and the cost of getting those
marks. Subtracting c(e) from both sides gives us:
ν = φf(a, e). (7)
– the output function in terms of the marks we observe ν. Students do not know their actual score
f(a, e) or the true harshness of the marker, φ. So we can write their output possibility function, which
describes the marks they think they can achieve, at some time t as:
νt = φtf(a, e)t, (8)
where f(a, e)t is what they think their actual mark is at t, and φt is how harsh they think the
marker is at t. We can thus recover their beliefs about the harshness of the marker:
φt =
νt
f(a, e)t
, (9)
if we can infer the mark they think they should have gotten f(a, e)t. Thus, what matters for
identification in this paper is that φ is multiplicative and c(e) is separable.
5Assuming that there are not so many rounds that we can expect their beliefs to have converged before the
end of the rounds.
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2 Design
The purpose of our experiment is to create an environment where subjects’ output depended on
ability, an action, and the fundamental, they could not separately identify the effect of their ability
and the fundamental on output, they would update their beliefs about the value of the fundamental
multiple times, and we can infer what these beliefs are. We experimentally induce the case of a
student completing an assignment marked by their professor. This is a one of the main examples from
Heidhues et al. (2018). We thus test the central prediction of the theory, using a prominent example
in their paper.
We get our subjects (students) to take a series of tests, marked by ‘the computer’ (the professor),
which only marks a proportion of correct answers as correct. The number of answers a subject gets
correct depends on their ability and the amount of effort they choose to put into the test (f(a, e)).
We use a cognitive skills test, so marks do depend on effort. We mark a constant proportion of correct
answers as correct (φ), which is multiplicative, and pay subjects for each mark they get correct.
Putting in more effort into the test is costly (c(e)) and this cost is separable. Spending longer on
each question costs subjects in time and opportunity cost, but cost is not affected by the value of the
fundamental.
After each test, subjects bid for the chance to take another test at the end of the experiment.
Subjects know every correct answer in this test will be marked as correct. Thus, their bid allows us
to infer the marks they think they should have gotten. We know the number of marks we give each
subject for each test. Therefore, we can recover their belief about the fundamental by dividing the
number of marks they actually got by the number of marks indicated by their bid, as in (9).
Figure 2 shows our experiment. We used a ‘within-sample’ design - we measured each subject
taking multiple tests over time as opposed to using a treatment and control sample (e.g see Charness
et al. (2011)). Using the same subjects is better for testing how the subjects learn over time.
Subjects took five rounds of tests. In each round, subjects took a test of eight questions, ‘marked
by the computer’. ‘The computer’ marked 50% of correct answers as incorrect, and all incorrect
answers as incorrect. Thus, the true value of the fundamental, Φ, is 0.5. Subjects do not know what
this proportion is. It is the same in each round. After each test, subjects were given $0.05 for each
answer marked as correct. For example, if a subject got six answers correct, we tell them they got
three marks and award them $0.15. After each payment, subjects then bid for a chance to take another
test where each correct answer would be marked as correct. Thus, if a subject got six answers correct
in this test, they would get six marks. After the fifth round, we randomly select one of these bids and
use it play a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak game (BDM hereafter). If they win, they then take the test.
Before starting the tests, subjects read a set of instructions. We told them they would take a series
of tests which ‘the computer’ would mark, and would be paid for each answer ‘the computer’ marked
as correct. We told them it would mark a fixed proportion of answers they got correct as incorrect,
but not the proportion. Next, subjects read a second set of instructions telling them how the BDM
game works. They were told that they would be asked to bid for the chance to take another test at the
end of the experiment after they had taken each test, and that one of their bids would be randomly
selected to see if they took the test.6 We then tested their understanding of the optimal strategy in
the game. Subjects had to reread the instructions and retake the test until they selected the correct
bid.
In the first round, subjects were asked to guess how many questions they had gotten correct before
we showed them their mark. This is how many answers they had actually gotten correct, not how
marks they thought the computer will give them (which they know will be lower). For example,
imagine a subject thinks they got six answers correct, and got five marks. We ask them for the
number of answers they got correct, so they will say six. We used these to screen for overconfidence.
If a subjects guessed that they had gotten a higher number of questions correct than they actually
had, we inferred that they were overconfident; if not, we inferred that they were underconfident.7 If
6We include pictures of the instructions, other screens subjects saw in the experiment, and a list of the
questions in the Appendix
7Some might argue this is too weak a signal of overconfidence. But this is also used by others to determine
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Figure 2: Experimental Setup
I think I got six correct but I actually got four, I have unrealistically high expectations of my own
ability. If I think I got six correct but I actually got eight, I have unrealistically low expectations of
my own ability.
After the subject has taken all five tests, we randomly select one bid and use it to play a BDM
game (Becker et al. (1964)). This is an auction game, where a subject first bids for the item (the
extra test). Then we generate a random number between zero and the maximum monetary value of
the test - this is its price. If the bid is greater than or equal to the price, the subject purchases the
test for that price. They then take the test. A subject’s optimal strategy is to bid the exact monetary
value of the test to them. As the monetary value of each correct answer is common knowledge, we
can infer how many questions they think they would get correct from the amount they bid. If they
won, subjects then took the test and then the experiment ended. If they lost, the experiment ended.
We directly observe the output that subjects observe - we know what mark each subject gets each
round. As above, in the BDM game subjects’ best strategy is to bid the exact monetary value of
the test to them – φf(a, e) when φ = 1. Hence we can assume that their bid represents the value
of f(a, e)t (their score) in the final test given their belief about the marker that round. We recover
f(a, e)t, the number of answers they think they would get correct given their beliefs as that time, by
dividing their bid at t by the value of each correct answer in the final test. Therefore, we can recover
their belief about the fundamental using (9) - dividing the marks they got by the marks they think
whether individuals are overconfident (e.g Burks et al. (2013)). Some might also worry that ordering effects (e.g
see Peiran & Nax (2018)) will bias subjects’ answers. But the distribution of subjects’ answers and confidence
provides strong evidence against ordering effects – see the Appendix.
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they would get if they took a test where all correct answers were marked as correct.
A potential confound is that subjects might not bid their maximum willingness to pay for the
test given all the information they have about the marker at that time. If they do not, we cannot
infer how many questions they think they would get correct without the marker from their bid. This
is why we use a BDM game instead of directly asking subjects their belief about φ. Experimental
tests have shown that, if it is stated carefully, subjects bid their maximum willingness to pay in BDM
games not just in theory but in practice (see Lusk & Rousou (2006), and Lusk & Shogren (2007)).
Hence each bid will be an accurate measure of subjects’ willingness to pay for the extra test after each
round, given the information they obtain from that round. To further incentivise subjects to update
on the information they have and bid accurately, we raised the piece rate for the final test to $0.20
per question.
Also, subjects may not have understood the BDM game correctly. Then, their bids would not
have accurately reflected their beliefs about the computerised marker. Hence, we took steps to ensure
subjects understood the game. We based our instructions on the instructions in Berry et al. (2018),
who field tested and adjusted them to ensure subjects would understand the game correctly. We
also used examples, gave a link to a page explaining why it was in subjects’ best interest to bid
their maximum willingness to pay for the test, and did not allow subjects to progress until they had
correctly answered questions showing that they have understood the game. These features have been
shown to help subjects understand how to bid (see Lusk & Shogren (2007)).
Three potential issues could also arise with the questions: subjects could not have gotten any
questions correct, subjects could have looked up the answers online, or the test score could be in-
dependent of effort. The first is an issue because if subjects did not get any questions correct, they
could not have made an inference about φ. Their mark would have been zero whatever φ is. The
second is an issue because if subjects could look up answers, then they could observe their own output
independent of φ. The third is an issue because subjects could either know the answers to questions
or not. If they either know the answers or not, they cannot adjust their effort in response to their
beliefs about φ. Thus, the theory would not apply. The second was a particular worry because we
are conducting the experiment online so subjects could search for answers, and if subjects did find
them then they could share them with other subjects using the MTurk forum. Experimenters often
use questions from management school entrance exams (Kruger 1999) or general knowledge questions
with unintuitive answers (e.g see Ludwig & Nafziger (2011)), but questions from management school
entrance exams are too difficult for a lot of participants, and general knowledge questions that have
unintuitive answers can easily be looked up online.
Therefore we took the questions from the practice book for the CEM 11+ verbal reasoning exam-
ination: a verbal reasoning test taken by some primary school students in the UK. These questions
are designed for primary school children, so are relatively easy. Furthermore we trialled the questions
that we used: we gave a group of MTurkers (n=38) one of each of the type questions from the paper,
examined the mean score for each type of question. We then selected the questions that the highest
proportion of subjects got right, and used these questions in our main experiment. Subjects could not
look up the answers to the questions as they are not available online - they are only published in the
practice book. Though they are relatively easy, they are not factual questions – they are questions that
require subjects to think to obtain an answer. Thus, subjects can put in different levels of effort, and
we expect test scores to vary with effort. Experimental evidence subjects do vary effort on these types
of cognitive test, and that scores do vary with effort (e.g see Segal (2012), Borghans et al. (2008)).
In addition to trialling the questions, we trialled different versions of the design to see whether parts
of the description were unclear. We iteratively trialled and improved our design, both on undergraduate
students and MTurkers, paying special attention to the BDM instructions. We excluded all individuals
who took part in any trial from the main experiment.
We implemented the experiment as an online survey using Qualtrics, and recruited subjects on
Amazon MTurk. 226 subjects participated in the experiment. After excluding those who failed our
attention check, we have 189 observations.8 The experiment took an average of 37 minutes including
8Subjects who know that these studies often include attention checks may only pay attention to the bits
of the experiment likely to include attention checks, and enter random results afterwards. To exclude such
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instructions. On average, subjects earned $0.81, with standard deviation of $0.61.
3 Results
Our first result supports the first prediction.
Result 1 Overconfident subjects have lower beliefs about the value of the fundamental than undercon-
fident subjects
Figures 3 shows the distribution of overconfident and underconfident subjects’ beliefs about φ
(‘Phi’ ) each round. Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics. Figure 4 shows the mean of overconfident
subjects’ beliefs about φ each round.
Table 1: Subjects’ Confidence, Raw Scores, Bids, and Beliefs About the Marker
Statistic N Mean St. Dev.
Overconfidence 189 2.450 2.422
Score 189 1.929 1.2752
Bid 189 1.041 0.349
Phi 189 0.426 0.328
To identify differences between overconfident and underconfident subjects beliefs, we regress sub-
jects perceptions of the computer after round one and after round five on a dummy variable, OV ERCONFIDENT .
For some subject i, OV ERCONFIDENTi = 1 if and only if i is overconfident, and is 0 otherwise.
We then include gender, age, and ethnicity controls.
After round 1:
φi,1 = α+ β ·OV ERCONFIDENTi + γ ·X + ui. (10)
After round 5:
φi,5 = α+ β ·OV ERCONFIDENTi + γ ·X + ui. (11)
Figure 3: The Distribution of Overconfident (Blue) and Underconfident (Red) Subjects’ Beliefs
About the Accuracy of the Marker (‘Phi’) Each Round
Notes: The green line shows the true value of the fundamental.
subjects, we remove those whose bids generate implausible values of φ - those that are undefined or greater
than 1.5
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Figure 4: Mean Beliefs of Overconfident and Underconfident Subjects Over Rounds
Notes: The green line shows the true value of the fundamental. Shaded areas show 2 s.d around the mean.
The results of both regressions are given in Table 2. There is a statistically significant difference
between overconfident and underconfident subjects beliefs about φ after the final round. As the model
predicts, overconfident subjects on average believe that the computer marked a lower proportion
of their answers correctly than underconfident subjects. But we also find a statistically significant
difference between overconfident and underconfident subjects’ beliefs about the fundamental after the
first round. Figure 4 shows this difference. The effect remains significant when we control for gender
(dummy variable 1 if male, 0 otherwise), age, and ethnicity (dummy variable 1 if white, 0 otherwise),
but gets smaller. All of the control variables are significant except age in the first round, and gender
in both.
We do not try to identify a causal relationship - there might ommitted variable bias from factors
we did not observe, such as IQ (e.g see Burks et al. 2013).
The second result is consistent with Heidhues et al.’s theory. If the theory is correct, overconfident
subjects’ beliefs about φ should fall over the rounds. By contrast, underconfident subjects’ beliefs
about φ should converge towards 0.5 over the rounds. Thus, we should find a significant difference
between overconfident and underconfident subjects’ beliefs in the final round. But, the first result is
not. We might still see difference after the first round if overconfident subjects update their belief by
a large amount. We would expect to see a larger difference after the fifth round than the first - a more
negative coefficient. Both sets of subjects have updated their beliefs more times, so overconfident
subjects’s beliefs should have fallen more while underconfident subjects’ should have converged more
towards 0.5. We find, however, that coefficient in the first regression is more negative in the first round
than the fifth.
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Table 2: The Difference Between Overconfident and Underconfident Subjects’ Beliefs About
the Accuracy of the Marker
OLS: Accuracy of marker OLS: Accuracy of marker
(round 1) (round 5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 if overconfident −0.4422*** −0.4444*** −0.4318*** −0.4146*** −0.4163*** −0.4172*** −0.3864*** −0.3577***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.052) (0.052) (0.049) (0.049)
1 if male −0.0265 −0.0190 0.0052 −0.0108 0.0074 0.0479
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041)
Age 0.0047 0.0031 0.0114*** 0.0088***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1 if white 0.0902** 0.1505***
(0.039) (0.044)
Constant 0.7570*** 0.7729*** 0.6065*** 0.5848*** 0.7232*** 0.7297*** 0.3233*** 0.2871***
(0.039) (0.045) (0.084) (0.083) (0.046) (0.053) (0.094) (0.092)
Observations 189 189 189 189 189 189 189 189
Adjusted R2 0.349 0.348 0.363 0.377 0.253 0.249 0.337 0.374
Notes: The dependent variable is the proportion of correct answers that the subject believes are marked as
incorrect after the round given. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Ex-ante power analysis suggested
that with our sample sizes, we can detect the effect sizes we found with a power asymptotically close to 1.
***Significant at the 1% level
**Significant at the 5% level
*Significant at the 10% level
Result 2 Updating did not cause a change in overconfident subjects’ beliefs about the fundamental
Result 3 Updating did not cause underconfident subjects’ beliefs about the fundamental to converge
towards its actual value.
We then test the causal effect of updating on subjects’ beliefs. We use a panel regression model,
as our data has both cross-sectional and time components - the subject, and their belief about φ after
each round. As the model makes different predictions for overconfident and underconfident subjects,
we estimate a different model for each.
To identify the causal effects of updating on overconfident subjects’ beliefs about φ, we use a fixed
effects panel model. Each observation is subject’s result in one round of the experiment.9
φi,t = αi + β ·ROUNDi,t + ui,t (12)
for t = 1, ..., 5, i = 1, ..., 149
ROUNDi,t is the round number, equivalent to the number of times the subject has updated their
beliefs. Including individual fixed effects controls for all time-invariant individual differences. The only
thing that changes over the rounds in the experiment is the number of times the subject updates their
belief. Therefore, including individual fixed-effects allows us to identify the causal effect of updating
on overconfident individuals’ beliefs about φ - the coefficient β is the effect of just changing the number
of times they have updated on subjects’ beliefs about φ, holding all else fixed through the individual
fixed effects.
9We carry out a Hausman test to determine whether a random or fixed effects model was appropriate. We
are able to reject the null hypothesis that a random effects model is appropriate at a 5 percent significance level
(p = 7.28.e−49).
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To work out the causal effect of updating for underconfident subjects, we need to use a different
dependent variable. The model predicts that underconfident subjects’ beliefs will converge to some
distance ∆ from Φ. But they may approach this point from below, above, or fluctuate around the true
value. Therefore, we want to identify the effect of updating on the distance of underconfident subjects’
beliefs about φ from Φ. The model predicts that underconfident subjects’ beliefs will converge to a
point nearer Φ, so there should be a negative causal effect of updating on the distance of their beliefs
from Φ.10 Therefore, we regress the number of update rounds on the squared distance of the subject’s
belief about φ from Φ (0.5):
yi,t = αi + β ·ROUNDi,t + ui,t, (13)
where:
yi,t = (φi,t − Φ)2 (14)
for t = 1, ..., 5, i = 1, ..., 40.
As above, ROUNDi,t is the round number, equivalent to the number of times the subject has
updated their beliefs. As before, including individual fixed effects allows us to identify the causal
effect of updating, as the number of times subjects update is the only factor that varies over time
in our experiment. β is the causal effect of updating beliefs on y. We square the distance so that
deviations above and below 0.5 are treated equally. The results of both regressions are given in Table 3.
Table 3: The Causal Effect of Updating on Beliefs About the Accuracy of the Marker
Fixed Effects: Fixed Effects:
Accuracy of Marker - Variance of Beliefs
Overconfident Subjects Around True φ -
Underconfident Subjects
(1) (2)
Round −0.0029 −0.0030
(0.0045) (0.0089)
Observations 745 200
R2 0.0009 0.0010
Notes: The dependent variable for overconfident subjects is the proportion of correct answers that the subject
believes are marked as incorrect. The dependent variable for underconfident subjects is the squared distance
of belief from 0.5. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level
**Significant at the 5% level
*Significant at the 10% level
If Heidhues et al.’s model is correct, we would expect to see a statistically significant and negative
coefficient in both cases. Updating causes overconfident subjects’ beliefs to decrease (prediction 2),
and the spread of underconfident subjects’ beliefs to decrease (prediction 3). We do find negative
10We carry out a Hausman test to determine whether a random or fixed effects model was appropriate. We
are able to reject the null hypothesis that a random effects model is appropriate at a 5 percent significance level
(p = 2.01.e−6).
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coefficients, but neither are significant. Thus these results suggest that the theory does not correctly
predict how overconfident or underconfident subjects learn about the fundamental.11
We might also understand the model as only describing individuals who do not update their belief
about their own ability.12 If so, predictions 2 and 3 would only hold for subjects who do not update
their beliefs about their own ability. Therefore, we take the subset of our sample who do not appear
to update their belief about their own ability over the experiment and then re–run the analysis with
on just their results. 13 We find 90 overconfident and 26 underconfident subjects who do not update
their beliefs about their own ability. Thus, we omit the underconfident subjects as we have too few
for any results to be reliable. If this interpretation of the theory is correct, we should now find a
significant effect. We still find no significant effect.
The expected change might also be non–linear. In this case, and the non–linearity is extreme,
we might not detect any effect even if it is present. Thus, we also re–run the analysis above with a
non–linear model. We still find no significant effect in either case.
Result 4 There is no evidence that a proportion of overconfident subjects that update like Heidhues
et al. predict
Yet, we might have heterogeneous treatment effects. Updating may cause a proportion of overcon-
fident subjects’ beliefs to fall, but the proportion might just be small enough that we do not detect
any significant effect in the regression. To see if there is any evidence for this, we then construct a
non-parametric Gaussian mixture model, and apply it to the overconfident subjects’ results from the
first and fifth round.14
A Gaussian mixture model is an algorithm that divides a set of data into a number of clusters.
The modeller takes a set of data, and specifies a number of clusters to divide the data into. The
algorithm then finds the clusters that best describes the information in the data, using an expectation-
maximisation algorithm.15 To do this, you need to know the numbers of clusters to divide the data
into, which we did not. Hence our algorithm takes a range of possible number of clusters (one to
fifteen), clusters the data, and gives each assignment a score based on how well it describes the data.
The algorithm then selects the model with the best score.16
We have a set of points representing each subjects’ scores and beliefs about φ in the first and
fifth rounds. If updating does cause an overconfident subject’s beliefs to fall over updating rounds,
the point representing their score should move downwards in the φ dimension between the rounds.
Thus, if updating causes all overconfident subjects’ beliefs about φ to fall, the pairs of results in the
first and final round should appear to be drawn from two different distributions one for subjects in
11Learning effects are often a problem for within-subject designs. If subjects repeatedly take the same test,
they could learn how to answer the questions, and hence get better at the test. This would invalidate our
identification strategy. We test for learning effects (see Appendix), and find no evidence that subjects got
better at tests over the course of the experiment.
12Note this is not how Heidhues et al. (2018) describe it – they motivate the model by saying that the
assumption that overconfident individuals do not update their beliefs about their ability is accurate, or a proxy
for other economic and psychological forces that produce the same effect.
13We say a subject does not update their belief about their own ability if their bid does not vary by more
than one mark between the first and final rounds, and between any two rounds. A subject’s optimal ability
in the test they are bidding for remains the same over each round, as the fundamental in that test does not
change. Thus, we can interpret changes in these bids as representing changes in beliefs about their own ability.
14We built and implemented the algorithm in Python using the Scikit Learn package - see https : //scikit−
learn.org/
15More technically, the modeller specifies the number of Gaussian distributions they think the data is drawn
from. The algorithm then finds the number of distributions (clusters) that best describe the data. As we
say above, we use a non-parametric version of the model. Therefore we fit models with a range of different
numbers of distributions, and then select the model that captures the most information about the data using
an information criterion.
16More technically, we calculate the ‘Bayesian Information’ score of each possible model, and minimise this.
Our results do not depend on the information criterion we use - see the Appendix
14
Figure 5: Example Gaussian Mixture Model Output
Example of output we would observe if all subjects could be described using Heidhues et al. (2018)’s theory.
Generated using synthetic data with n = 100. Means and marks for each distribution are generated to make
them two distributions as clear and distinct as possible.
the first round with a higher belief about φ, and another for subjects from the final round with a
lower belief about φ (e.g see Figure 5). Now consider the case of heterogeneous treatment effects. If
updating does cause some subjects’ beliefs about φ to fall, but not the others, the algorithm should
identify those subjects points as being drawn from two distributions, one higher in φ space and the
other lower in φ space, in amongst noise. Using the Gaussian mixture model is a better way of
identifying heterogeneous causal effects than simply looking at the distribution of treatment effects.
Using the algorithm, we detect effects by finding the data generating process that best accounts for
the information in the sample. But, if all of the individual treatment effects were drawn randomly,
some may be large enough to appear significant by chance, not due to the underlying data generating
process. Thus, if we just look at the individual effects, it may appear as if a proportion of our subjects
followed Heidhues et al.’s model, even if they did not.
Yet, as shown in Figure 6, the model that best fits our data does not look like this - individuals
appear to be drawn from distributions centered on output, not beliefs about φ.17 Thus, there is no
evidence that any proportion of individuals follow Heidhues et al.’s theory.
17Note that this is not just because there can be a greater ranges of output than φ values - see the Appendix.
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Figure 6: Clusters in Data from Overconfident Subjects in Rounds 1 and 5
4 Discussion
In this paper, we experimentally test the theory in Heidhues et al. (2018) that confidence affects how
individuals learn about fundamentals when they cannot separately identify the effects of their abil-
ity and the fundamentals on their output. This describes a large proportion of individuals in many
economically important situations, such as managers delegating to employees, politicians allocating
resources to projects, and CEOs making investment decisions. If their theory is correct, overconfident
individuals act sub–optimally in all of these situations because of how they learn about the fundamen-
tals. As these decisions affect many individuals and a huge percentage of world output, this would
imply large welfare losses. If a social planner could intervene to correct how they learn for less than
the costs the decisions impose, perhaps by review processes that force individuals to update their
beliefs about their own ability or allow them to separately identify its effect on output, the theory
implies that this would be welfare–improving.
Overconfident individuals do appear to have lower beliefs about the fundamental after multiple
updating rounds, as the model predicts. But they also have lower beliefs about the fundamental
after a single round. Overconfident subjects initially have lower beliefs about the fundamental, so the
difference in the final could be because neither group’s beliefs about the computerised marker change
over time. Our evidence suggests that the theory is not a good description of how how individuals
learn. Though we find that updating causes overconfident subjects’ beliefs about the fundamental to
fall, and underconfident subjects’ to converge nearer the true value, neither effect is significant. We
also do not find any clustering patterns consistent with a group of overconfident individuals learning
as the model predicts. This suggests that the coefficients are negative due to chance, not a causal
effect.
One explanation of our results is that subjects simply did not update their beliefs throughout our
experiment. This is implausible for two reasons: the subjects receive new information each round,
and the BDM mechanism directly incentivises them to use this information to update their beliefs
about the marker each round. If they did not update their beliefs, subjects would not bid the optimal
amount for the test, as the additional information from that round may change their willingness to pay
for the test. This explanation also cannot account for the significant difference between overconfident
and underconfident subjects’ beliefs about the marker after the first round. If the only reason for our
results is that subjects do not update over the experiment, we would not expect to see a difference
between the mean beliefs of overconfident and underconfident subjects in either round. Their prior
probabilities can be modelled as if they are drawn from the same distribution, so their means should
be the same (see Heidhues et al. (2018)).
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Another obvious explanation of our results is that individuals update their beliefs about their
own ability. If overconfident individuals do update their beliefs about their own ability, the learning
process given in the model may not occur. Note, however, that if they do not update their belief
about their own ability enough in response to evidence, they will still make incorrect inferences about
the fundamental and thus they will still end up with inaccurate beliefs. The student will still think
the professor is harsher than they are, though not as harsh as they would have done. Experimental
evidence that overconfident individuals do seek information about their own ability when updating
their beliefs supports this explanation (e.g see Burks et al. (2013)). If this was the only explanation,
we would expect to see a significant effect in the sub–sample who do not update their beliefs about
their own ability. We do not. It also does not explain the difference in the mean beliefs between
overconfident and underconfident subjects we observe at the beginning of the experiment.
Finally, the model could be misspecified. Just being overconfident, or another factor that covaries
with overconfidence, could directly cause individuals to have unrealistically low perceptions of the
fundamental. If so, overconfident individuals would always have lower perceptions of the fundamental.
This would explain why there is no evidence of change of beliefs about the marker over the experiment;
why in our panel regressions we find fixed effects that varied across individuals and had a significant
impact upon beliefs about the marker; and why there is already a significant difference between
overconfident and underconfident subjects after the first round of updating. This explanation is
also consistent with experiments that have shown that sub-optimal decisions made by overconfident
individuals are sensitive to factors other than confidence (e.g Malmendier & Tate (2005)).
Others could extend our research by directly testing these explanations. We only identify sub-
jects’ beliefs about the fundamental. Others could collect more detailed data on personal attributes
following Malmendier & Tate (2005), and test whether any predict lower beliefs about the value of
the fundamental in these situations The model and our results both suggest that overconfident indi-
viduals will take sub-optimal actions in situations where they cannot separately identify the effect of
the fundamental and ability on output, as they have unrealistically low beliefs about φ. Others could
test whether this occurs, and measure the magnitude of welfare losses from these decisions.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Robustness Checks - Order Effects
Ordering effects (e.g see Peiran & Nax (2018)) might confound our measure of subjects’ overconfidence,
as subjects answers may depend on our framing in the instructions. To assess whether subjects are
overconfident or underconfident, we ask to guess the number of questions they actually got correct
in the first round before we tell them their mark, and compare that to the number of questions they
did actually get correct. In our instructions, we say that the marker will mark some correct answers
as incorrect. This is not directly relevant to subjects’ answers, as we clearly ask them about the
questions they actually got correct, not the mark that the marker gives them. This might cause an
order effect, however – our negative framing of the marker in the instructions may spill over into
subjects perceptions of their own ability. If so, subjects estimates of their score will be lower than
they should be. Thus, we would infer that more subjects are underconfident than we should. As we
are seeking to identify different effects in both groups, this would distort our results.
Figure 7: Subjects’ Predicted Scores Figure 8: Subjects’ Confidence
Figure 7 shows the distribution of subjects beliefs about the number of questions they got correct.
If there are these order effect in our experiment, our framing of the instructions will shift individuals’
beliefs about their own ability downwards from what they should have been. Thus, we would not
expect to see many individuals with very high beliefs about their own ability. But, many subjects do
have high beliefs about their own ability - 23 out of 189 think they got all of the questions correct,
and 79 think they only got one question wrong. This is strong evidence we do not have order effects.
5.2 Robustness Checks - Learning Effects
As we use a within-subject design, we carry out some further analysis to see if there is evidence that
subjects learn how to answer our tests over the course of the experiment (learning effects). Learning
effects are a common problem for within-sample designs, and would cast doubt on our results. We
construct the following fixed effect regression model for overconfident and underconfident subjects:18
SCOREi,t = αi + β.ROUNDi,t + ui,t
If subjects learn the answers to questions over the course of the experiment, we would expect to
see a significant positive coefficient on scores in each regression.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 3. The mean scores of overconfident and
underconfident subjects each round are shown in Figures 9 and 10.
18We carry out a Hausman test to determine whether a random or fixed effects model was appropriate. We
are able to reject the null hypothesis that a random effects model is appropriate at a 5 percent significance level
(p = 1.98.e47).
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Table 4: The Effect of Taking Tests on Subjects’ Actual Test Scores
Fixed Effects: Fixed Effects
Test Score- Test Score-
Overconfident Subjects Underconfident Subjects
(1) (2)
Round 0.0322 −0.1675***
(0.0293) (0.0430)
Observations 745 200
R2 0.0023 0.0617
Notes: The dependent variable is subjects’ actual score in the test each round. Standard errors are given in
parentheses.
***Significant at the 1% level
**Significant at the 5% level
*Significant at the 10% level
Figure 9: Overconfident Subjects’ Scores Over
the Experiment
Figure 10: Underconfident Subjects’ Scores
Over the Experiment
Neither regression coefficient is positive and significant. Thus, there is no evidence of learning
effects.
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5.3 Robustness Checks - Gaussian Mixture Model
The Gaussian mixture model might have clustered subjects as it has in Figure 6 because subjects can
get a greater range of marks than beliefs about φ. Hence the Euclidean distance between subjects who
have the same mark but different beliefs about φ will tend to be higher than between subjects who
have the same beliefs about φ but different marks. So the algorithm might be more likely to cluster
subjects by mark than by φ.
To ensure that this is not why our algorithm is clustering subjects as in Figure 6, we multiplied
each subject’s φ value by 10. This means the Euclidean distance between subjects with different beliefs
about φ but the same mark will tend to be higher than between subjects with different marks but the
same belief about φ. If the algorithm is just clustering subjects in Figure 6 because of the different
ranges of mark and φ, the clusters will disappear.
We then ran the same algorithm to cluster this new data. The results are below:
Figure 11: Clusters in Data from Overconfident Subjects in Rounds 1 and 5 - Transformed
Data
Generated with the data from overconfident subjects in round 1 and 5, where all ‘Phi’ values are multiplied by
10
The clusters from Figure 6 do not disappear. Hence there is no evidence that we find these clusters
because marks and beliefs about φ are defined over different ranges.
The results could also just be because of the information criterion we use to select models - the
Bayesian information criterion. To check for this, we re-ran the algorithm and used the alternative
Akaike information criterion instead. The algorithm assigns all points to exactly the same clusters.
21
5.4 Survey Instructions and Design
In this section, we go though our survey and show what subjects saw at each stage. This subsection
includes the instructions subjects read. The next section presents the questions we asked subjects by
round.
Instructions:
If a subject failed the attention check, they were shown the following message and we ended the
survey.
22
BDM instructions and test for understanding:
23
Subjects then took 5 rounds of tests. These are the screens subjects saw during the first round:
24
25
26
After they had completed all of the rounds, a bid was then selected:
If they did not win the extra test, subjects were shown this screen:
If not, then they took the bonus test as below:
27
At the end of the experiment, subjects were first asked to complete some questions before the end.
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5.4.1 Test Questions
Questions used by round:
Round 1
1. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
(release acquit) (leak ooze) liberate exude pardon drip discharge
2. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28, the answer would be 33.
17, 21, 23, 27, 29,
3. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e
goa , efy, fle , ull
4. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 1, 4, 5, 9, 14, the answer would be 56.
2, 4, 5, 8, 8, 16, 11
5. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Soldier is to (virtuous, honorable, amiable) as traitor is to (crass, deserter, shameful).
6. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for ’Destroy’ is to ’(erase, finish, obliterate)’ as ’build’ is to ’(invent, origi-
nate, assemble)’ would be ’obliterate, assemble’.
One is to (arithmetic, addition, telescope) as two is to (binoculars, subtraction, abacus).
7. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets
Example: the answer to (feathers fluff) (sad upset) blue fur down unhappy miserable would be
down
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(allow agree) (warrant licence) let permit consent authorisation enable
8. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e
do , eam, pi , ap
Round 2
1. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets.
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
(access doorway) (delight charm) entrance portal captivate bewitch gate.
2. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28, the answer would be 33.
14, 17, 19, 20, 20
3. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e.
loo , ole, for , elt
4. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Heart is to (circulation, blood, arteries) as lungs is to (organ, air, throat).
5. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets.
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
(error fault) (muddle confuse) wrong mistake puzzle baffle slip
6. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33.
1, 4, 9, 16, 25
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7. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e.
min , ar, se , ast
8. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Dull is to (dim slow dirty) as light is to (bright beacon coloured)
Round 3
1. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
(dry clear) (nice lovely) bright good great fine
2. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33. 4, 10, 16, 22, 28,
3. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e
bra , est, war , ose
4. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Smell is to (sense, sneeze, nose) as hear is to (listen, ear, noise).
5. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets.
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
(near adjacent) (shut secure) lock adjoining close seal neighbouring
6. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
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Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33
.
6, 5, 5, 6, 8,
7. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e.
bar , ey, mar , it
8. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Car is to (wheel, engine, oil) as carriage is to (axle, horse, gilded)
Round 4
1. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
(turn revolve) (bun bread) snack spin circle roll.
2. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33.
1, 10, 19, 28, 37,
3. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e.
he , ain, pe , ed
4. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Paint is to (easel artist brush) as stone is to (catapult wall sculptor).
5. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets.
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
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(article item) (aim end) object motive goal thing gadget
6. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33.
8, 9, 13, 7, 18, 5,
7. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e.
le , low, fla , un
8. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Doctor is to (hospital, medicine, nurse) as solicitor is to (client, contract, law)
Round 5
1. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
(pink blush) (soared ascended) red rose bloom floated
2. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33.
1, 2, 3, 5, 8,
3. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e.
ra , et, bu , east
4. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Teacher is to (desk, classroom, school) as professor is to (university, lecture, study).
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5. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets.
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
(award medal) (value cherish) bonus reward treasure love prize
6. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33.
37, 35, 31, 25, 17,
7. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e.
bo , ay, se , it
8. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Apple is to (crunchy, orchard, core) as grape is to (sweet, wine, vineyard)
Bonus Round
1. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets
Example: the answer to ’(topic theme) (citizen resident) issue inhabitant subject person point’
would be ’subject’.
(take guide) (first main) command chief lead direct
2. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33.
2, 4, 8, 16, 32,
3. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e.
ski , each, har , ane
4. Find the number that continues each sequence below in the best way.
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Example: if the sequence was 13, 18, 23, 28 the answer would be 33.
16, 2, 14, 6, 12, 10,
5. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for Roof is to (gutter, chimney, tiles) as wall is to (paint, strong, bricks)
would be tiles, bricks.
Tractor is to (trailer plough farmer) as tank is to (fish soldier cannon).
6. Write two words, one from each set of brackets, that complete the sentence in the most sensible
way.
Example: The answer for ’Destroy’ is to ’(erase, finish, obliterate)’ as ’build’ is to ’(invent, origi-
nate, assemble)’ would be ’obliterate, assemble’.
Bread is to (wheat roll knead) as butter is to (churn dish cheese).
7. Select the word outside the brackets that has a similar meaning to the words in both sets of
brackets
Example: the answer to (feathers fluff) (sad upset) blue fur down unhappy miserable would be
down
(firm solid) (difficult awkward) rigid complex stiff troublesome hard
8. Find the letter that will complete all of the following words:
Example: The letter that completes car , asy, fir , ver would be e.
mil , ong, pee , oot
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